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Abstract
With growing popularity of mobile Internet, providing secure wireless services has become a critical
issue. Physical layer security (PHY-security) has been recognized as an effective means to enhance
wireless security by exploiting wireless medium characteristics, e.g., fading, noise, and interference.
A particularly interesting PHY-security technology is cooperative relay due to the fact that it helps to
provide distributed diversity and shorten access distance. This article offers a tutorial on various multi-
antenna relaying technologies to improve security at physical layer. The state of the art research results
on multi-antenna relay aided PHY-security as well as some secrecy performance optimization schemes
are presented. In particular, we focus on large-scale MIMO (LS-MIMO) relaying technology, which is
effective to tackle various challenging issues for implementing wireless PHY-security, such as short-
distance interception without eavesdropper channel state information (CSI) and with imperfect legitimate
CSI. Moreover, the future directions are identified for further enhancement of secrecy performance.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, multi-antenna relay, LS-MIMO, secrecy performance optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
We have witnessed significant growth in wireless communications due to the rapid technolog-
ical advancements in cellular, sensor, cyber-physical, and machine-to-machine (M2M) commu-
nication networks. Applications based on these diverse wireless systems are used to transmit and
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receive confidential/private data (e.g., credit card information, energy pricing, e-helath data, com-
mand and control messages, etc.). Therefore, it is important to guarantee secure communications
in the presence of possible undesired third parties, e.g., attackers, eavesdroppers, adversaries
with malicious data injection capability, etc. Traditionally, secure communication systems were
implemented using upper layer protocols and tools, such as cryptography. However, cryptography
requires an extra secure channel for exchange of private keys. Note that for mobile or unstructured
networks, it is difficult to provide a reliably secure channel. Recently, a new paradigm known
as PHY-security that exploits the randomness of wireless propagation medium has emerged
[1]. The benefits of PHY-security are two-fold. First, heavy dependence on complex higher-
layer encryption may not be necessary, leaving more computation resources for communications.
Second, PHY-security avoids the use of private keys, and thus it can be made more applicable.
And in practical systems, PHY-security can serve as an additional layer of protection on top of
the existing security features.
From an information-theoretic viewpoint, the essence of PHY-security is to maximize the
performance difference between legitimate and eavesdropper channels [2]. Generally speaking,
it aims to enhance the legitimate signal and impair the eavesdropper signal simultaneously, thus
realizing secure, reliable, and QoS-guaranteed communications. In this context, a variety of
physical layer techniques can be utilized to enhance wireless security. Wherein, multi-antenna
technique is one of the most powerful ways for secure communications. Making use of spatial
degrees of freedom, it is possible for us to increase the legitimate channel rate and concurrently
decrease the eavesdropper channel rate. As a simple example, if signal is transmitted in the null
space of the eavesdropper channel, the eavesdropper cannot receive any information, and thus
information leakage is avoided. It is worth pointing out that the quality of both legitimate and
interception signals are related largely to the propagation distance. If the interception distance
is short, it is difficult to provide a high QoS-guaranteed secure communication even exploiting
the benefit of multi-antenna technique. This is because the gain from multi-antenna technique
is small compared to path loss of signal propagation. To address this challenge, the relaying
technology was introduced into PHY-security, so as to shorten the propagation distance of the
legitimate signal [3]. Especially, the multi-antenna relaying technology has attracted considerable
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attention as it has the advantages of both multi-antenna and relaying technologies.
To fully exploit the benefits of multi-antenna relaying technology for PHY-security, it is
necessary to adaptively adjust the transmit parameters, such as transmit beams, transmit powers,
transmit durations, and relaying protocols [4]. Intuitively, in order to implement these secrecy
performance optimization schemes, the transmitters require full or at least partial CSI. Unlike
traditional relaying systems, the secrecy relaying system involves different types of CSI. In
addition to the legitimate CSI about source-relay and relay-destination channels, there is the
eavesdropper CSI about source-eavesdropper and relay-eavesdropper channels. As revealed in
the literatures, the CSI has a great impact on the performance of adaptive transmission techniques.
If full CSI is available at the source and the relay, it is possible to attain a steady secrecy rate,
or even achieve the secrecy capacity. However, eavesdropper CSI is usually unavailable, since
an eavesdropper can be passive and keeps silent. In this case, it is impossible to provide a
steady secrecy rate over all realizations of fading channels. To this end, some new performance
metrics, i.e., ergodic secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability, and interception probability, are
proposed accordingly to evaluate wireless security in a statistical sense [5]. Moreover, legitimate
CSI may also be imperfect as normally it is obtained through limited feedback or by making
use of channel reciprocity. Under this condition, it is nontrivial to design adaptive performance
optimization schemes.
In this article, we intend to provide an overview on various state-of-the-art multi-antenna
relaying technologies from the perspective of PHY-security. Especially, we investigate viable
secrecy performance optimization schemes in the framework of multi-antenna secure relaying
system. Then, we discuss and analyze an up-to-date multi-antenna relaying technology, namely
large-scale MIMO (LS-MIMO) relaying, to show the benefits of cooperative schemes for wireless
security. At the end, we conclude the whole article with a discussion on future research directions
on secure relaying systems.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART MULTI-ANTENNA SECURE RELAYING TECHNOLOGIES
Some pioneering works on multi-antenna relaying technologies for PHY-security revealed the
fundamental functions on wireless security. Specifically, the multi-antenna relay plays two roles:
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1) To help the source by enhancing channel quality to the legitimate destination;
2) To repress the interception by deteriorating the channel condition to the eavesdropper.
The performance of multi-antenna relay for PHY-security depends mainly on relaying protocols
and schemes. For example, amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) are two
commonly used relaying protocols [6] [7]. AF protocol forwards the signal polluted by noise,
while DF protocol forwards the original signal by decoding the received signal at the relay. From
the perspective of PHY-security, it is not easy to judge which protocol is better. In general, the
relaying protocol is selected according to relaying scheme and channel condition. In what follows,
we provide an overview of various multi-antenna secure relaying schemes.
A. One-Way Relaying
Source
Eavesdropper
Relay
Destination
Eavesdropper
Relay
Destination
Source
Fig. 1. A model of one-way secure relaying system.
One-way multi-antenna secure relaying technology is the most popular relaying scheme. In this
case, to accomplish a transmission two time slots are required. As shown in Fig. 1, during the first
time slot, the source sends message to the relay, and then the relay forwards the post-processed
signal to the legitimate destination within the second time slot. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper
also receives the signals and tries to decode them. In order to improve the secrecy performance,
a feasible way is the use of multi-antenna techniques at the relay. For both AF and DF protocols,
zero-forcing (ZF), minimum mean square error (MMSE) or match filter (MF) receiver can be
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utilized in the first time slot. Similarly, ZF, MMSE or MF transmitter is applicable within the
second time slot [8]. Then, with different transceivers and relaying protocols at the relay, there are
eighteen combinations in total. According to channel conditions, it is possible to select an optimal
combination. For example, the MMSE receiver can mitigate the noise, and then AF is used due to
its low complexity. Moreover, a ZF transmitter can effectively decrease the information leakage
if eavesdropper CSI is available. Even without eavesdropper CSI, the transceiver designed based
only on legitimate CSI is beneficial for secrecy performance enhancement.
Moreover, with multiple antennas at the relay, cooperative jamming can also be used to
further improve the secrecy performance. Specifically speaking, a relay generates interference
independent of the source message (such as artificial noise) towards an eavesdropper. In order to
avoid interference to the destination, the jamming signal is transmitted in the null space of the
relay-destination channel, making use of spatial degrees of freedom of the multi-antenna relay.
Similarly, the source can also send the jamming signal to interfere with the eavesdropper in the
second time slot. It is worth pointing out that there are two potential problems for cooperative
jamming. First, if CSI is imperfect, cooperative jamming may result in residual interference to
the destination. However, even with residual interference, it may be still beneficial for wireless
security to adopt cooperative jamming as long as legitimate CSI is sufficiently accurate. Second,
the jamming signal consumes extra power. Thus, in power-limited secure systems, it makes sense
to design an energy-efficient cooperative jamming scheme.
B. Two-Way Relaying
In a two-way relaying case, the source and the destination exchange message with the aid of
a multi-antenna relay in two time slots. Specifically, two nodes send their signals simultaneously
to the relay during the first time slot. Then, the relay broadcasts the post-processed mixed signal
based on AF or DF relaying protocol. Each node subtracts its transmitted signal from the received
signal, and then recovers the information from the other node. Compared to one-way relaying,
two-way relaying has two advantages from the perspective of wireless security. First, two-way
relaying doubles the spectral efficiency of the legitimate signal transmission. Second, the current
transmission of two signals may degrade the quality of the interception signal, since there is no
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interference cancelation at the eavesdropper.
The key of two-way relaying for PHY-security lies on the design of transceiver at the multi-
antenna relay. On one hand, the interference between two legitimate signals should be avoided,
while still guaranteeing a high spectral efficiency. To this end, some advanced network coding
techniques can be used at the relay [9]. For example, physical layer network coding performs
XOR operation to the two signals on bit level after decoding the two signals from the mixed
signal, and then the desired signal can be recovered at each source using XOR operation to
the received signal based on its own transmit signal. Moreover, ZF beamforming can also be
adopted to separate the two signals in space. On the other hand, wireless security should be
fulfilled by decreasing information leakage to the eavesdropper. If full or partial eavesdropper CSI
is available, ZF or MMSE beamforming is an effective way to reduce the information leakage.
Otherwise, if there is no eavesdropper CSI, cooperative jamming can be used to enhanced wireless
security.
Note that in order to decrease the complexity of separating the mixed signal at a relay, it is
likely to transform the traditional two-slot two-way relaying to a three-slot scheme. Specifically,
one source first sends message, and then the other source transmits its signal. Finally, the relay
broadcasts the post-processed signal. This transformed scheme may weaken the wireless security,
since there is no self-interference during the first two time slots. Moreover, it requires a longer
transmission time. However, it may achieve a balance between security and complexity. In
addition, if the compute-and-forward protocol is used, the relay does not need to decode each
signal from the mixed signal. Instead, it can decode a function of the signals and forward it,
which can further reduce the complexity.
C. Full-Duplex Relaying
Both one-way and two-way relaying adopt half duplex scheme, which separates the processes
of transmitting and receiving in time. However, if the relay can simultaneously transmit and
receive signals, namely full-duplex relaying [10], as seen in Fig. 2, the spectral efficiency can be
doubled with respect to one-way relaying. In addition, the signals from the source and the relay
may produce extra interferences to the eavesdropper, and thus improve the secrecy performance.
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Eavesdropper
Relay
Source
Destination
Fig. 2. A model of full-duplex secure relaying system.
Although full-duplex brings great benefits for wireless security, still it faces many challenging
issues. The biggest problem is the self-interference from the transmitted signal from the relay
to the received signal at the relay [10]. Due to relatively short propagation distance, the self-
interference may severely degrade the performance. Intuitively, it is possible to cancel the inter-
ference from the received signal, since the relay knows the transmit signal perfectly. However,
self interference is also affected by the loop channel from the transmitter to the receiver. If the
CSI for the loop channel is imperfect, the interference cannot be cancelled completely. More
importantly, since interference has its pros and cons in PHY-security, it may not be optimal
to cancel interference completely for full-duplex relaying. A feasible way is a joint design of
transmit and receive beams at the relay in order to achieve a fine balance between the effects of
self-interference on the legitimate and interception signals.
D. Cooperative Relaying
If there is a strict spatial limitation at the relay, it may be impossible to deploy multiple anten-
nas. In this case, multiple single-antenna relays can cooperatively assist secure communications
[11]. The advantages of cooperative relaying for PHY-security are two-fold. First, these relays
are geographically distributed, then the access distance of the destination may be shortened,
and thus the secrecy performance is improved. Second, these relays can play different roles
according to channel conditions. For example, the relays close to the eavesdropper may act
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as cooperative jammers, so as to generate strong interferences to the eavesdropper. The other
relays still forward the legitimate signal cooperatively. Compared to cooperative jamming in a
co-located multi-antenna relay, the one with cooperative relaying has a lower complexity.
However, cooperative relaying also faces some implementation difficulties. Specifically, co-
operative relaying is in general carried out in a distributed way. Thus, the synchronization for
multiple relays is a nontrivial task, especially for the relays with different roles. Moreover, CSI
exchange between the relays is also challenging. It may increase overheads, and an intelligent
eavesdropper can obtain the CSI. If it succeeds, these kind of disruptive attacks can be a serious
thread and will significantly impair the secrecy performance as a whole.
E. Untrusted Relaying
A key feature in relaying systems as described above is that they all assumed that the relay
can be trusted. In other words, the relay will assist secure transmissions in the best way they can.
However, from recent research works, several papers have considered the use of untrusted relays
[12]. In a untrusted relay model, although the relay is a cooperative node, information intended
for the destination must be kept secret from it. Another line of works assumed that the relay is
“malicious”, i.e., the relay may try to modify the retransmitted signal towards the destination.
The use of untrusted relay may occur in several cases. For example, in public networks, the
relays that are used for connectivity may belong to a third party. Such relays can operate with
standard protocols although they can be unauthenticated. Malicious relay scenarios can occur in
military applications as well, where an enemy can “pretend” to be a cooperative node forwarding
the malicious data to the destination.
The untrusted relaying has a great impact on the secrecy performance. The achievable secrecy
rate of the DF protocol is zero, while the AF protocol can achieve a nonzero secrecy rate. A
feasible solution to the untrusted relaying is the use of cooperative jamming. A friend sends a
jamming signal to interfere the relay, but the destination can completely cancel the interference
with aprior knowledge. Thus, the secrecy performance in the case of the untrusted relaying can
be improved.
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III. ADAPTIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR MULTI-ANTENNA SECURE RELAYING
In multi-antenna relay networks, there are different types of resources, such as power, time,
space and antenna resources. These resources will affect the quality of both legitimate and
interception signals, and thus it makes sense to allocate them according to channel conditions and
system parameters [13]. However, resource allocation in secure communications is a nontrivial
task. In what follows, we discuss several key issues on resource allocation in multi-antenna
secure relaying systems.
A. Adaptive Beamforming
Beamforming has a great impact on the secrecy performance. As aforementioned, if the
legitimate signal is transmitted in the null space of the eavesdropper channel, the eavesdropper
cannot receive any information. However, implementation of beamforming in secure relaying
systems is not easy, especially in the case without eavesdropper CSI. In general, the source and
the relay design the beams independently. Then, the source constructs a beam aiming at the relay
if it knows legitimate CSI only. However, the beamforming design at the relay involves multiple
factors. It is quite complex and can only be made suboptimal. On one hand, the beamforming
scheme is related to the relaying protocols. For example, the AF protocol will forward the noise,
and then it is better to adopt a beam that may achieve a tradeoff between enhancing the signal
and mitigating the noise, i.e., ZF and MMSE. The DF forwards the original signal, and thus
MF beamforming can maximize the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the destination. On the other
hand, the receive beam in the first time slot and the transmit beam in the second time slot
should be designed jointly. Generally speaking, the receive beam will determine the quality of
the legitimate signal, while the transmit beam can impair the interception signal. In addition, if
full-duplex relaying is adopted, the receive and transmit beams should be designed carefully to
deal with the effect of self-interference.
B. Power Allocation
In traditional communications without security requirements, the communication quality, e.g.,
transmission rate, is usually an increasing function of transmit power. However, the power has a
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side effect in secure communications. This is because increasing the power would simultaneously
improve the performance of the legitimate and the eavesdropper channels. Thus, the power should
be allocated adaptively to the conditions of the legitimate and the eavesdropper channels.
In secure relaying systems, power allocation becomes more complicated, since the powers
at the source and the relay are inter-related. For example, based on the DF relaying protocol,
the legitimate channel rate is determined by the smaller of the rates of the source-relay and the
relay-destination channels. Therefore, it does not make sense to increase the power on one side,
but fix the other. For the AF relaying protocol, increasing the relay power may amplify the noise,
resulting in performance saturation. In addition, if a more advanced relaying scheme is adopted,
power allocation should be adjusted accordingly. As a simple example, in full-duplex relaying
systems, the relay power directly determines self-interference, and thus the power allocation
should consider the interference cancelation scheme and the effect of the interference on the
interception signal. Moreover, for secure relaying systems with cooperative jamming, if the total
relay power is constrained, it is necessary to distribute the power between the forwarding signal
and the jamming signal.
C. Time Allocation
In general, the durations for the first and the second time slots in relaying systems are equally
allocated. Such an allocation scheme is simple and asymptotically optimal, if the relay is at the
middle of the source and the destination. However, in secure relaying systems, since the channels
from the source to the eavesdropper and that from the relay to the eavesdropper may be quite
different, equal duration allocation may result in obvious secrecy performance loss. Specifically,
if the eavesdropper is closer to the relay, it makes sense to distribute a longer duration to the
first time slot. Intuitively, time allocation is also related to the other system parameters, i.e.,
relaying protocol and transmit power. Hence, time allocation can effectively enhance the secrecy
performance.
D. Antenna Selection
In multi-antenna secure relaying systems, the antennas at the relay have different effects on the
secrecy performance if the channels experience independent fadings. As mentioned in cooperative
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relaying, some relays may be closer to the eavesdropper, and thus the forwarding of these relays
may lead to information leakage. Even in a co-located multi-antenna relaying system, certain
channels from a relay antenna to the destination may experience deep fading, but the channel to
the eavesdropper may have a high gain. In this case, the use of these antennas not only wastes
the power, but also degrades the secrecy performance.
Antenna selection in secure relaying systems is not a trivial issue, since it is a combinatorial
optimization problem from a pure mathematical viewpoint. If the number of antennas is not
so large, it is possible to select the optimal antennas by exhaustive searching. Otherwise, some
suboptimal scheme may be used to select the antennas. For example, if eavesdropper CSI is
unavailable, the antennas can be selected only according to the quality of the legitimate channels.
E. Relaying Protocol Switch
There exist various relaying protocols, where AF and DF are two most commonly used ones.
In secure relaying systems, there is no dominant protocol. As channel conditions change, the
optimal relaying protocol may also vary. Thus, it makes sense to switch the relaying protocols
according to channel conditions in order to optimize the secrecy performance.
It is worth pointing out that the above resource allocation schemes are interactive. For example,
power allocation scheme may affect the time allocation. Thus, it is better to optimize these
resources jointly in order to maximize the secrecy performance.
IV. LARGE-SCALE MIMO RELAYING FOR PLS
In secure communications, there may be some adverse conditions, e.g., no eavesdropper CSI
and imperfect legitimate CSI. In this context, if the interception distance is relatively short, then
even with a multi-antenna relay, the secrecy performance may be very poor. As a result, it is
difficult to provide secure, reliable and QoS guaranteed communications.
To solve the problem with short-distance interception in secure communications, we recently
proposed to use large-scale MIMO (LS-MIMO) relaying technology to enhance wireless security
significantly [14]. LS-MIMO can generate a very high-resolution spatial beam, making use of
a large number of antennas. Thus, on one hand, the performance of the legitimate channel
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can be improved enormously due to the high array gain. On the other hand, the information
leakage to unintended users can be made very small. Especially, as the number of antennas
tends to be infinity, the information leakage is negligible. Then, even under adverse conditions,
it is still likely to achieve a good secrecy performance. Additionally, compared to traditional
multi-antenna secure relaying technologies, LS-MIMO secure relaying technology offers several
appealing advantages. First, LS-MIMO simplifies the signal processing, and even with a low-
complexity transceiver at the relay, i.e., maximum ratio combination (MRC) and maximum ratio
transmission (MRT), it is still able to achieve a good performance. Second, it is easy to improve
the secrecy performance by adding antennas only at the relay. Third, due to channel hardening in
LS-MIMO systems, the performance analysis and optimization becomes simpler. In what follows,
we show the performance gain of several adaptive resource allocation schemes in LS-MIMO
secure relaying systems through numerical simulations.
Let us consider a one-way secure relaying system, where the source communicates with
the destination with the aid of an LS-MIMO relay. The number of antennas NR at the relay
is very large, e.g., NR = 100 or even bigger. The relay has full CSI about the source-relay
channel through channel estimation, imperfect CSI of the relay-destination channel due to channel
reciprocity, but no CSI of the relay-eavesdropper channel. The eavesdropper is closer to the
relay, but not the source, since it assumes that the signal is from the relay directly. We use
αS,R, αR,D, and αR,E to denote the normalized path loss of the source-relay channel, the relay-
destination channel, and the relay-eavesdropper channel, respectively. Note that we take secrecy
outage capacity as the performance metric, since eavesdropper CSI is unavailable. Secrecy outage
capacity is defined as the maximum transmission rate, while secrecy outage probability needs
to satisfy a given constraint. In this manuscript, the bound on secrecy outage probability is set
to 0.05.
First, we show the performance gain of joint resource allocation over fixed resource allocation
scheme in a DF LS-MIMO secure relaying system. For analysis convenience, we normalize
αS,R = αR,D = 1, and use αR,E >> 1 to represent short-distance interception. We consider
the optimization of source power, relay power and duration ratio between the first and the
second hops. As seen in Fig. 3, joint power and time allocation scheme obviously performs
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Fig. 3. Secrecy performance comparison with joint and fixed power allocation.
better than power allocation with fixed time allocation scheme. This is because duration ratio
between the two hops also has a great impact on the secrecy performance. For example, if
the eavesdropper is close to the relay, it is better to use a small duration in the second hop.
Meanwhile, transmit powers at the source and the relay also affect the duration ratio. Thus, it
makes sense to optimize power and time jointly. Moreover, if both power and time are fixed
regardless of channel conditions and system parameters, there will be more performance loss.
Thus, joint resource allocation can effectively improve the secrecy performance.
Then, we examine the impact of the number of antennas at the relay on the secrecy performance
in an AF LS-MIMO secure relaying system with αS,R = αR,D = αR,E = 1. Intuitively,
adding more antennas can always improve secrecy outage capacity, but also increases resource
consumption, such as power. In this case, we take secrecy energy efficiency as the performance
metric, which is defined as the ratio of secrecy outage capacity and total consumed power,
including transmit power, circuitry power per antenna, and basic power independent of the
number of antennas. In Fig. 4, we use PC to denote the circuitry power per antenna. It is
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Fig. 4. Secrecy energy efficiency of a secure relaying system with different numbers of antennas.
found that if PC is very small, i.e., PC = −20 dB, adding more antennas is always helpful
to increase the secrecy energy efficiency. However, with PC = −10 dB, the energy efficiency
first increases and then decreases as the number of antennas increases. This is because when
the number of antennas is small, adding more antennas can increase the secrecy outage capacity
significantly. However, when the number of antennas is relatively large, although adding more
antennas can further increase the secrecy outage capacity, the consumed power increases sharply.
Thus, it makes sense to select the optimal number of antennas in order to maximize the energy
efficiency.
In summary, adaptive resource allocation can effectively improve the secrecy performance.
LS-MIMO secure relaying technology simplifies the signal processing and thus it is possible to
optimize the utilization of different resources jointly, such as power and time. Therefore, wireless
security can be enhanced significantly.
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V. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Wireless security is always a critical issue. Although the introduction of multi-antenna relay
can improve the secrecy performance effectively, there are many challenges remained to be
tackled. As our future works, we intend to solve these problems in the following directions to
enhance wireless security further.
A. Mobile Relay
The position of the relay has a great impact on the performance, especially in secure mobile
communications. As channel conditions change, the optimal position of the relay may also
need to vary accordingly. Hence, a fixed relay may result in an obvious performance loss. If
it is a vehicular relay, it should be able to flexibly move the position and select the secrecy
scheme. For example, the relay moves closer to the eavesdropper to strengthen the interference
to the eavesdropper through cooperative jamming. However, it is not a trivial task to design the
scheme of mobile relay. First, it requires full CSI, which increases the overhead. Second, there
is a balance between secrecy performance and implementing complexity, which is again an open
issue.
B. Multiuser Access
In modern communications, multiuser concurrent transmission is commonly used to improve
the spectral efficiency. For example, the LTE system supports multiple users’ access through
a relay. In multiuser secure relaying systems, multiuser transmission faces several challenges.
On one hand, the inter-user interference degrades the secrecy performance. On the other hand,
the inter-user interference can be used to impair the interception signal. Thus, it is necessary to
design effective user scheduling and precoding schemes to optimize the secrecy performance.
C. Combination of Encryption and PHY-Security
PHY-security emphasizes mainly on pure signal processing techniques, while high-layer cryp-
tographic techniques works well independent of channel conditions. In secure relaying systems,
the CSI may be imperfect or even unavailable, and then we can integrate cryptographic techniques
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into the transceiver design. Combining cryptographic techniques and PHY-security offers another
way to improve the secrecy performance significantly.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article provides an overview of multi-antenna relaying technologies in PHY-security, and
discusses the opportunities and challenges in the design of secure relaying systems. Through
analyzing the characteristics of secure relaying communications, we give a comprehensive tutorial
on adaptive resource allocation schemes to further improve the secrecy performance. To solve the
problem with short-distance interception under adverse conditions, we proposed to use LS-MIMO
relaying technology and showed its effectiveness through simulations. Finally, we identified
several research directions as our future works.
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